When Anxiety Is Attributed to the Workplace
Mental health in the workplace has become one of the most sensitive issues for companies, employees and Human Resources departments. Medical leave related to anxiety, stress, depression, burnout or workplace conflicts is becoming increasingly common.
However, not every psychological condition that an employee subjectively associates with their work environment can automatically be classified as an occupational accident. The distinction between a common contingency and an occupational contingency requires a careful analysis of the cause, the facts proven and the objective connection between the condition and the work activity.
Judgment No. 2913/2026 of the High Court of Justice of Galicia, dated 25 June 2026, addresses precisely this issue. The case analyses whether a temporary incapacity process initiated due to a diagnosis of “generalised anxiety disorder” should be considered an occupational accident or a common illness.
The Court confirms that, in the case analysed, it was not sufficient for the employee to perceive their anxiety condition as being linked to the workplace. It was necessary to prove an objective element, sufficiently relevant and connected to the work activity, capable of explaining the condition as the exclusive or essential cause of the temporary incapacity process.
Background of the Claim
The proceedings arise from an employee who provided services for MN Program Software, S.L. from 2 June 2004 until 20 April 2023. The company had contracted Ibermutua for the coverage of occupational contingencies.
The employee performed administrative duties related to the Human Resources department. Among other responsibilities, he managed absence control, received holiday schedules and participated in interviews for vacant positions. He also carried out tasks related to systems and infrastructure, had access to employee monitoring and control systems, maintained conversations with clients and operators, managed problems related to facilities, requested quotations for refurbishments and repairs, and even prepared an emergency plan. For these purposes, he had access to company equipment, including a computer, tablet and company mobile phone.
On 3 April 2023, he began a temporary incapacity process with a diagnosis of “generalised anxiety disorder”. Subsequently, on 25 April 2023, he attended urgent medical assistance following the delivery of the dismissal letter, and remained on temporary incapacity leave until 1 April 2024, receiving follow-up treatment from the Mental Health Unit of CHUS.
The employee requested a determination of contingency before the National Social Security Institute (INSS). He sought recognition that the medical leave had resulted from an occupational accident.
However, the Provincial Directorate of the INSS determined that the process was classified as a common illness.
Following that decision, the employee initiated legal proceedings.
Decision of the Labour Court
The Labour Court No. 5 of A Coruña dismissed the employee’s claim.
The first-instance judgment confirmed the administrative classification of the process as a common illness. In other words, it did not consider that the temporary incapacity beginning on 3 April 2023 resulted from an occupational accident.
The employee appealed before the High Court of Justice of Galicia. He requested that the first-instance judgment be overturned and that the temporary incapacity process be declared as deriving from an occupational accident, with the defendants being ordered to assume the corresponding financial consequences.
The Employee’s Arguments
The employee argued that his situation should be classified as an occupational accident. To support this position, he relied on Articles 156.2(e) and 156.2(f) of the Spanish General Social Security Law (LGSS).
His argument was that he was suffering from a case of burnout syndrome. According to his position, the anxiety disorder had been caused, or at least aggravated, by an inadequate working environment, an excessive workload and workplace conflicts that allegedly continued even after the termination of the employment relationship.
He also referred to several medical reports. These reports mentioned anxiety symptoms in the context of workplace stress, a mixed anxiety and depressive reaction related to occupational stressors, and subsequent worsening of his condition.
Based on this documentation, he attempted to strengthen the connection between the medical condition and his work activity.
The employee also argued that there were no previous similar conditions or other factors that could explain the illness. Therefore, he considered that the cause had to be found in the workplace situation.
The Position of the Mutual Insurance Company and the Employer
The mutual insurance company opposed the appeal. It argued that Article 156.2(f) LGSS could not apply because this provision requires the existence of an event occurring during working time and at the workplace that aggravates a previous condition.
According to the mutual insurance company, no such event had occurred.
It also argued that the employee presented chronic organic symptoms unrelated to his employment relationship and that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the condition was caused exclusively by the work activity.
The company also challenged the appeal. It argued that the intensity of the employee’s assigned tasks, their exclusive nature and the allegedly overwhelming nature of the position had not been proven.
Furthermore, it rejected the possibility of considering that a previous condition had worsened due to the circumstances alleged by the employee.
The Legal Question: Common Illness or Occupational Accident?
The key issue in the case was determining whether a temporary incapacity process caused by anxiety could fall within the legal concept of an occupational accident.
Article 156 of the General Social Security Law allows certain illnesses to be classified as occupational accidents. However, not every condition related to work automatically receives this classification.
The judgment distinguishes between several possible situations.
Firstly, there are illnesses contracted as a consequence of work, provided that it is proven that the illness was caused exclusively by the performance of professional duties. This corresponds to Article 156.2(e) LGSS.
Secondly, there are illnesses or previous conditions suffered by the employee that worsen as a consequence of an injury constituting an occupational accident. This corresponds to Article 156.2(f) LGSS.
Finally, the judgment also analyses the presumption of occupational origin established in Article 156.3 LGSS, which presumes that injuries suffered during working time and at the workplace are occupational accidents.
The Presumption of Occupational Origin and Its Limits
The High Court of Justice recalls that the presumption of occupational origin may also apply to illnesses, not only to accidents in the strict sense.
In cases involving illnesses that develop gradually or progressively over time, applying this presumption becomes more complex. That evolves slowly cannot always be linked to a specific moment and place within the workplace.
Therefore, the Court explains that the presumption requires objective circumstances showing the external manifestation of the illness during working time and at the workplace. Only specific episodes, crises or particularly serious manifestations that can be located within those circumstances may activate the presumption established in Article 156.3 LGSS.
This distinction is particularly relevant in relation to psychological conditions. Anxiety, stress and depression may have multiple causes and may develop progressively over time. Therefore, it is not sufficient for an employee to attribute their discomfort or condition to work. A sufficient causal link must be objectively proven.
Why the Presumption Did Not Apply in This Case
In the case analysed, the temporary incapacity process began on 3 April 2023 due to generalised anxiety disorder. The Court acknowledges that this type of condition may, in theory, have an occupational origin.
However, no specific episode or crisis occurring during working time and at the workplace was identified that would allow the presumption of occupational origin under Article 156.3 LGSS to apply.
Furthermore, the disciplinary dismissal took place on 20 April 2023, meaning that it occurred after the temporary incapacity process had already started.
The urgent medical assistance received on 25 April occurred after the dismissal letter had been delivered. However, this fact did not allow the Court to identify a previous workplace event that had been decisive in causing the condition.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the presumption of occupational accident could not automatically apply.
Subjective Perception Is Not Enough
One of the most relevant aspects of the judgment is the conclusion that the employee’s subjective perception is not sufficient to classify sick leave as an occupational contingency.
The Court accepts that a psychological condition may be experienced by an employee as a reaction to their professional activity or workplace environment.
However, this perception alone does not give the medical leave the status of an occupational contingency. It is necessary to prove an objective element: a triggering factor, an external event connected with work, or a workplace stimulus with sufficient relevance to be considered the cause of the illness.
Likewise, it is not enough for work to be one factor among several contributing elements. Under Article 156.2(e) LGSS, work must be the exclusive or, at least, the essential causal factor.
This principle is particularly relevant for companies and employees. Mental health-related absences require careful assessment. Nevertheless, the existence of workplace stress, conflict or dissatisfaction does not automatically transform the contingency into an occupational one.
Decision of the High Court of Justice of Galicia
The High Court of Justice of Galicia dismissed the employee’s appeal.
The Court confirmed the judgment issued by Labour Court No. 5 of A Coruña and maintained the classification of the temporary incapacity process as a common illness.
The Court concluded that there was no evidence of a crisis occurring during working time and at the workplace that would allow the presumption of occupational origin to apply.
Likewise, it was not proven that the anxiety disorder had the exclusive or essential cause of the professional activity.
Therefore, the temporary incapacity process initiated on 3 April 2023 was not recognised as resulting from an occupational accident.
The Key Legal Principle of the Judgment
The judgment does not deny that psychological conditions may have a work-related origin. Nor does it exclude that workplace stress, burnout or certain employment conflicts may eventually qualify as occupational contingencies.
However, the Court establishes a more precise requirement: that connection must be proven.
For anxiety-related sick leave to be considered an occupational contingency, it is not sufficient for the employee to associate their condition with work or for medical reports to mention workplace stressors.
Objective facts must be established in order to demonstrate a sufficient causal relationship.
In the absence of a specific event occurring during working time and at the workplace, or clear evidence that professional activity was the exclusive or essential cause of the illness, the contingency will remain classified as common.
Practical Impact for Companies and Human Resources Departments
The judgment provides several important lessons for companies and Human Resources departments.
First, anxiety and stress-related absences must be managed with particular caution. They should not be minimised or treated as merely personal conflicts. However, they also cannot automatically be classified as occupational contingencies without sufficient evidence.
Second, documentation relating to the position, workload, working hours, responsibilities and preventive measures may become decisive.
In this case, the absence of evidence demonstrating an objectively excessive workload was relevant in rejecting the existence of burnout.
Third, companies should maintain effective psychosocial risk prevention policies. Although the occupational classification was rejected in this case, the judgment indirectly reinforces the importance of properly identifying and documenting risks associated with workplace stress.
Fourth, when personal, family or medical factors unrelated to work are present, causal analysis becomes more complex. Employers, mutual insurance companies and the INSS must assess all circumstances involved, rather than relying solely on the employee’s subjective perception.
Burnout, Workplace Stress and Evidence
Burnout syndrome requires more than fatigue, discomfort or workplace tension.
The judgment recalls that, according to the ICD-11 classification, burnout is the result of chronic workplace stress that has not been successfully managed.
Therefore, in order to legally support its recognition as an occupational condition, objective workplace circumstances must be demonstrated. These may include excessive workloads, lack of control over work, prolonged working hours, sustained accumulation of responsibilities, organisational pressure or a working environment capable of explaining the psychological condition.
Without this evidentiary basis, burnout may remain an allegation but not a sufficient legal ground to modify the classification of the contingency.
Mental Health Conditions May Be Work-Related, but They Must Be Proven
Judgment No. 2913/2026 of the High Court of Justice of Galicia confirms that anxiety-related sick leave does not automatically become an occupational accident simply because the employee associates it with their workplace.
Anxiety, stress and burnout may have a professional origin. However, changing the classification of the contingency requires objective evidence of a sufficient connection with work.
This connection may arise from a specific workplace event, an identifiable crisis occurring during working time and at the workplace, or clear evidence that professional activity was the exclusive or essential cause of the condition.
In the case analysed, the Court found that such evidence had not been provided. Therefore, it confirmed that the temporary incapacity process derived from a common illness.
At Suárez de Vivero, we advise companies, international groups and Human Resources departments on temporary incapacity management, occupational contingency disputes, psychosocial risk prevention, employment conflicts and legal defence in Social Security proceedings.
Frequently Asked Questions About Anxiety Leave and Occupational Accidents
Can anxiety-related sick leave be considered an occupational accident?
Yes, it can, provided that a sufficient causal connection with work is objectively proven. However, it is not enough for the employee to personally associate their anxiety with the workplace.
What must be proven for anxiety to qualify as an occupational contingency?
It must be proven that the condition was caused exclusively or essentially by work, or that a specific event or crisis occurring during working time and at the workplace triggered or aggravated the condition.
Are medical reports mentioning workplace stress sufficient?
Not necessarily. They may constitute relevant evidence, but they must be supported by objective facts proving the occupational cause.
The mere reference to workplace stressors in medical reports does not, by itself, establish that work was the determining cause of the condition. A sufficient causal connection must be demonstrated through evidence relating the illness to specific workplace circumstances.
What is the presumption of occupational origin?
The presumption of occupational origin means that injuries occurring during working time and at the workplace are presumed to be work-related.
However, when dealing with psychological conditions, the application of this presumption requires the existence of a specific manifestation, episode or crisis that can be located within those circumstances.
A gradual psychological condition, such as anxiety or stress, does not automatically fall within this presumption merely because it develops while the employee is working.
Can burnout be considered an occupational accident?
It may potentially qualify as an occupational contingency, but only if objective workplace circumstances are proven to demonstrate that the condition derives from professional activity.
Factors such as excessive workload, lack of control over tasks, sustained organisational pressure or prolonged exposure to harmful working conditions may be relevant.
However, general workplace dissatisfaction, personal perception of stress or ordinary professional difficulties are not sufficient on their own.
What happens if personal or family factors also exist?
The existence of personal, family or medical circumstances unrelated to work may make the causal analysis more complex.
In these cases, employers, mutual insurance companies and the INSS must assess all the circumstances involved and determine whether professional activity was truly the exclusive or essential cause of the condition.
The presence of external factors does not automatically exclude an occupational origin, but it may make proving that connection more difficult.
How should companies manage anxiety or stress-related absences?
Companies should approach these situations with caution and balance.
A mental health-related absence should not be ignored or treated as an ordinary workplace disagreement. At the same time, the existence of anxiety, stress or conflict does not automatically mean that the condition must be classified as an occupational contingency.
Companies should ensure proper documentation of working conditions, maintain effective psychosocial risk prevention measures and coordinate with mutual insurance companies, prevention services and legal advisers when the classification of the contingency is disputed.